at his grandparents', on his father's side, at Pembroke Lodge in Richmond Park. His grandfather, the first Earl Russell, had been Prime Minister, and was famous for having used the immense power of the British Empire with discretion. In his writings on education, Russell often referred to his own childhood, hoping to correct what he remembered as unsatisfactory. At least occasionally, he warned against drawing general conclusions from his limited experience; for example (Ax 26)* his diet was atrocious by current views and yet, as he goes on to point out, he never had a day's illness except for a mild attack of measles-and lived to be nearly 98, most of the time in excellent health and full of vigour. His psychological diet was, it seems, mildly unusual even for his time and class. Unlike, say, Churchill, he does not seem to have formed strong attachments to any of the people who actually brought him u p ; his nannies, governesses or tutors. He liked some of them well enough (Ax 31), but they do not seem to have stayed on for a long time; possibly as Russell himself suggests (Ax 49), because of the child's own nature and its effects on the people around him. All this may be relevant to the more painful episodes of Russell's life. For at least statistically, his kind of childhood goes with long periods of loneliness in later years and, above all, a very schematic understand ing of human nature which brings one unpleasant surprises; not only at other people's conduct (always doubly unpleasant if one likes to have good psycho logical judgement); but also at one's own feelings (when one is, so to speak, moved by one's own emotions rather than by their objects). Be that as it may, Russell's childhood was certainly not wholly unrewarding. He obviously had a great deal of affection for his family, in particular, for the remarkable collec tion of independent and, perhaps, formidable female relatives who must have enjoyed young Russell's attentions more than they let on (Ax 33-34). In any case they did not spoil his gifts for entertaining and scintillating in company. He describes their foibles mockingly, but the mockery is good humoured and gentle-in sharp contrast to his acid indiscretions about the dons at Trinity (Ax 89-90); 'in contrast' even if one allows for the objective differences between the foibles involved. As Russell was to find out, experience of his relatives had not prepared him adequately for some of the women he encountered later, at home and abroad.
Adolescence
He was educated privately, with plenty of free time to pursue those grand traditional questions which occur to us when-ontogenetically or phylogenetically-we begin to reflect. To some extent this was family business: John Stuart Mill was his godfather.
Almost inevitably in the circumstances, questions about Euclid's axioms crossed his mind. But, it seems, even at this early stage, he showed robust good sense. He did not dismiss the questions-and surely was much more had involved himself in America with some universities and their adminis trators who, realistically speaking, simply did not belong to Russell's world. Not likely to let a chance of an apt, but malicious observation pass, W. proposed the defence, Look at this face\ to the charge made against Russell (A2 334): roughly speaking, Russell's personal appearance at City College of New York would be 'dangerous to the virtue' of the tender souls that grow up in, say, Brooklyn. Both Russell and Wittgenstein, though very different, had splendid faces and great style. They were a little below average height, and delicately boned, but generally quite free from the jumpy nervousness that often goes with this physique. Their gestures were always sure, often graceful, and sometimes beautiful.
First world war
Except for a period in Brixton jail, when Russell wrote I.M.P., he devoted much of his energy to-and, perhaps, derived it from-politics and the kind of social life he missed during his first marriage. He was strongly opposed to England's participation in the war. But the theory behind his opposition, especially as he saw it later (A2 288), and his practical politics did not quite match.
He was not a doctrinaire pacifist, not a conscientious objector. He thought that ceteris paribus peace was better than war-like most people, even those whose wartime experiences constitute the most fulfilling part of their lives. His own activities show that he himself sometimes found it necessary to resist. At the time he was particularly struck by the possibilities of non-violent resistance (of Gandhi's followers against the British); but according to (A2 288), Russell had overlooked that such resistance presupposes 'certain virtues in those against whom it is employed'. Actually, he later advocated the use, or threat, of force; not only during the second world war (M.D. 17), but also after. In short, Russell objected to a specific war.
So much for theory. His anti-war propaganda pursued many different lines. In particular he was not jailed (in 1918) for pacifist convictions nor even for advocating non-violent resistance but for 'disaffecting' the troops. He had warned that America-reluctant as she was to enter the war at all-would send over troops to break strikes. (It is a moot point which was more far fetched: his warning or the charge against him that-presumably loyal-miners or soldiers were likely to be so easily 'disaffected'.) In any case, he liked jail quite well, in particular, smuggling love letters in volumes of the Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society (A2 31). Incidentally, Russell was in his mid forties, not of military age. He most certainly was not a mere coward; and nobody-including himself-had to ask himself if he was.
After a conviction in 1916 under the Defence of the Realm Act, Trinity College deprived him of his lecturership, a shabby act by any standards. So quick to see shabby motives, like envy, in himself, he seemed to think of the dons as moved solely by political 'passions' and bigotry; and of himself as a 'martyr'. The realities of the situation seem different from the public debate which concerned of course the formal, legal merits of the case. There was a 38 588 clash of temperament between Russell and those dons who opposed him (or: most of them; the matter is statistical since it concerns a vote). For many dons college life provided not so much a place for the pursuit of knowledge, but simply a shelter from practical life where one's opinions have to be put to the test of experience. Russell, full of dash and vigour, had little respect for the opinions of those who had 'no knowledge of life' (A! 240). The dons did not think lightly of their opinions. They happened to constitute a majority, and exercised their vote. Apart from formal rights and motives, there is a further point-however far it may have been from the minds of the opposition: realistically speaking, the normal duties of a college lecturer were hardly fitting for someone of Russell's standing at that time. Besides, as mentioned already, P.M. was not in a suitable shape for immediate consumption by his academic colleagues.
Russell, who had long found the dons uncongenial, cannot have expected them to behave differently, let alone more generously than they actually did. But, like Kierkegaard before him and others since, he may have had the illusion that it ought to be possible to make his smug opponents 'take notice' (even if he took little notice of them).
Between the wars
During the twenties Russell engaged in diverse activities; he lectured, wrote books on general philosophy, and pursued his interests in social questions. He travelled in many countries, including the U.S.S.R. and China. He was critical of the Soviet regime, unlike others in his circle, in particular, Dora Winifred Black whom he married in 1921, left in 1932 and by whom he was divorced in 1935. An unsatisfactory interview with Lenin, who showed little interest in Russell's political views, may have helped Russell see other defects of Lenin's judgement. As has long been known, prejudice sometimes permits us to see the mote when love blinds us to the beam. In contrast, China enchanted him, particularly the human qualities, of wit and finesse, which he found among Chinese intellectuals. In a memorable letter to Ottoline Morrell (A2 202), he spoke of political and 'bureaucratic machines [that] cared nothing for human values'. He meant the values of those particular qualities, of the Chinese and Oscar Wilde, which he himself possessed in the highest degree; not those surely much rarer qualities which permit a man to be both successful in public life and humanly impressive.
Russell and his second wife had 'advanced' social ideas. They also had the courage of their convictions. They decided, jointly (A2 222), to try out some of them ; a free school and a swinging marriage. He wrote Marriage and morals, which, though mentioned among his principal publications in the Nobel Prize vita on p. 129 of Holmberg (1951) , was not stated to be a, let alone the sole, reason for the prize-contrary to Russell's memory of it (A3 25). His advanced views became widely known.
His change of views, though expressed in the clearest possible terms, is less well known. He discovered that the views were trivially wrong (at least for him)
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Bertrand Arthur William Russell 589 inasmuch as they were refuted by commonplace events. The children were difficult; when told to brush their teeth, they would sometimes say 'Call this a free school!' (A2 227). As regards marriage, he had apparently completely forgotten to consider the case when the wife turns up with a child fathered by another man (A2 228); as he says (A2 288), he had been 'blinded by theory' -his own, not Hume's who goes into this sort of matter in section 195 on chastity (Hume, 1777 ). Russell did not try to refine his views; neither by the scientific method of making more actual or imagined (Gedanken) experiments nor by analysing the factors involved in happier historical precedents; for example, it has long been said, for good reasons given on pp. 210-211 of Bernard (1973) , that the painter Eugene Delacroix was Talleyrand's natural son; Eugene had the full blessing of M. Charles Delacroix, Talleyrand's predecessor (in office).
Actually, Russell hardly ever refined his views. He dropped them, replaced them by new views and usually-both in his younger days and later when he was nearly 90 (P.D. 41)-had 'an almost unbelievable optimism as to the finality of [his] own theories'. But now, pushing 60, he was less confident. In particular, he remained an agnostic on the subject of marriage (A2 228). And especially his last marriage, to Edith Branson Finch in 1952, seemed a good deal more peaceful-without theory and with 80 years behind him. He also wrote no more books like Marriage and morals which, in a sense, could induce a wife to be naughty out of sheer loyalty to her husband's views (though one would not wish to be too dogmatic in such matters).
During these difficult years, in the early thirties, he wrote several articles surveying his past. He even tried to find out about his genetic make-up, as it were, by assembling the Amherley papers' , in collaboration with Patricia Helen Spence, whom he married in 1936, and divorced in 1952 after she had left him in 1949. Perhaps the most critical point that struck him at the time (1931) is contained in the article Christmas at sea (A2 229); on the extent to which his life and his view of the world had depended 'on a superabundant vitality'. Clearly life had been simpler when there was plenty of energy to spare; the satisfying 'unity between opinion and emotion' in the first world war, of which he speaks nostalgically later (A2 289), goes naturally with vitality and with the conviction that one will solve problems as they come along, a convic tion produced by vitality. For this very reason the inconveniences directly due to vitality (such as the clash of temperament with the dons at Trinity) were not too disturbing. The decrease in vitality created different problems; most prosaically, presumably, the very marital problems that had taken him so badly by surprise. His writings give the impression that the decrease in the level of vitality to which he had been accustomed for nearly 60 years, had taken him by surprise too. If so, this must have created its own additional difficulties.
In 1939 he emigrated to America with his third wife and their young child born in 1937. He describes most vividly his experiences there and his reactions to them. They seem to be of general interest and will be taken up in part III as a typical example of Russell's contributions to what might be called literary social philosophy.
Return to England He was happy to return and happy with his reception. He was now the third Earl Russell, having inherited the title when his older brother Frank died in 1931. In 1949, he was appointed to the O.M., described as 'this odd miscellaneous order' in T. S. Eliot's letter of congratulation (A3 57). In the same year, Russell was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature. This unexpected honour pleased him too, but, understandably, not the somewhat absurd citation, mentioned already, on pp. 57-59 of Holmberg (1951) . It is not recorded whether Russell's own Nobel Prize speech was meant to be repay ment in kind. On p. 261 of N.P. he suggests that the Kaiser wanted the first world war because he was literally jealous of his Grandmamma, Queen Victoria, on account of her Navy.
Russell's untiring efforts for nuclear disarmament, after both East and West possessed nuclear weapons, are well known. It is, perhaps, less well known that in the late forties he advocated the threat of the atomic bomb against Stalin's Russia (A3 7-8). Whatever the merits of the proposal, many of the people I knew at the time were taken aback by it-some of us, but not all, much more so than by the proposals of preventive war ascribed to some Hungarian scientists (who had had a dose of communism-albeit the local variety-under Bela Kun). In the early sixties, at the beginning of a conversa tion partially reported on pp. 129-130 of Crawshay-Williams (1970), I asked Russell about his old proposal; admittedly in general terms. He immediately assumed that I objected to 'inconsistency', and answered (his own objection) with disarming logic: He did not want the bomb to be dropped on him; as long as the Russians did not have it, the proper thing was to prevent them from getting it; and when they had it, the proper thing was to persuade them not to use it. Obviously, he was quite fearless, in big things and in small ones. He was no more afraid for his own skin than he was afraid of my going out and telling his answer to some of his more fanatical admirers.
By this time he and his face had become part of our lives; organisations and foundations built up around him. One of them was the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. It is no doubt memorable for many things that it has done. But it was memorable even before it started, uniting among its sponsors Nehru of India and Ayub Khan of Pakistan, Albert Schweitzer and Kwame Nkrumah (whose political bible (Nkrumah 1970) contains a final chapter on set theory).
The touch of irreverence in the last paragraph is not unexpected from one who has been reading Russell a good deal, and writing about his life. But, perhaps inevitably in such circumstances, the irreverence is mixed up with a more personal note. Nobody reading the reflections which Russell wrote on his eightieth birthday, and reprinted 17 years later in (A3 326-330), can fail to be impressed by his strong sense of failure. At least as far as his scientific work is concerned, his disappointments are not founded on objective facts, but-as will be clear from parts II and III-mainly on a failure of memory and lack of knowledge; mistaken memory of the aims he actually formulated for his scientific work, and lack of knowledge of the remarkable 'extension of the sphere of reason to new provinces', as he put it in M.D. 20, by the work of others who built on his scientific ideas and achievements. As far as moral and political problems are concerned, the disappointments are understandable. As he put it (A3 328): in regard to those problems he did not 'pretend that what [he had] done . . . had any great importance'. It is far beyond the scope of this memoir to analyse to what extent this failure was due to the nature of these problems, to Russell's conceptions of them, and to his particular human qualities. His brother Frank considered these matters back in 1916 in a-for him-remarkably sombre letter (A2 85-86). Also Russell's own letter to Lady Ottoline, quoted on p. 588, may be relevant here.
Russell died on 2 February, 1970, at his home in Penrhyndeudraeth, Merionethshire, Wales. He is survived by his last three wives and by his three children, John Conrad, Katherine Jane (Tait) and Conrad Sebastian Robert.
II. M a th em a t ic a l L og ic a n d L og ic al F o u n d a t io n s of M a th em a t ic s
Some mathematical background will be assumed. Basic issues involved here, such as the meaning of 'foundations', are best discussed in the general context of part III, in connexion with the scope of (scientific) philosophy. But a few general remarks may be useful here to avoid misunderstanding.
Foundations: loaded terminology
The word 'foundations' suggests a firm basis for a superstructure, which is to be 'secured'; here, the superstructure of mathematical practice. Evidently it is not in need of greater 'security' or reliability if it is already 100% secure. Besides, ordinary clear exposition may well be the best method to achieve greater reliability where this is possible. Actually the term 'foundations' or 'Grundlagen' belongs to the familiar doctrines of finitism or formalism (rivals to Russell's school) which claim that the abstract principles of mathematical practice are not reliable. Thus, according to these doctrines, to be capable of reliable proof, an assertion about an abstract concept has to be reinterpreted in their doctrinaire terms. Since, in point of fact, long formal calculations have to be checked by means of short abstract considerations, clearly some kind of idealized reliability is meant; what 'should' be reliable, not what is reliable. And if the idealization is not realistic the doctrines are themselves questionable. Be that as it may, Russell's own aims were originally different though he occasionally used the word 'foundations', for example in I.M.P. 2. He did not assume that the basic (logical) notions would be particularly easy to grasp nor, a fortiori, that our assertions about them would be particularly 'reliable'. According to P.M. 12: 'It will be found that owing to the weakness of the imagination in dealing with simple abstract ideas no very great stress can be laid upon their obviousness. They are obvious to the instructed mind, but then so are many propositions which cannot be quite true, as being disproved by their contradictory consequences. The proof of a logical system is its adequacy and its coherence.' Even if Russell's views on the conclusions to be drawn from those contradic tory consequences (paradoxes) are questioned as on p. 598, the passage shows that he did not expect the basic logical propositions to be obvious or obviously reliable. In any case his original aim was not to cleanse mathe matics of the paradoxes because he started his work before he discovered them.
Russell's own work in the logical analysis of mathematics, that is, in building up mathematics from a few logical primitives, would seem to be better com pared to fundamental science such as the atomic theory of matter. The principal aim of that theory is hardly to 'secure' our ordinary physical know ledge-despite dramatic assertions, for example by Eddington who thought that it was correct to think of a table as being like a swarm of flies but false not to think about any micro-structure at all (which is what we normally do). Atomic theory builds up matter from a few elements and tries to derive the macroscopic laws from simpler laws for these elements. Correspondingly logical foundations 'build up' mathematical concepts by defining them from a few logical ones. Since Russell did not mention this comparison in his publications, I once asked him about it (in the conversation mentioned on p. 590); he agreed-whatever weight one may attach to spontaneous agree ment during a pleasant conversation.
Views differ on the pedagogic value of the comparison since, to some, it suggests that mathematical objects are physical substances. Here it is only intended to prepare the reader for some peculiar difficulties of foundations which are similar to those of the fundamental sciences, not to those in the bulk of everyday scientific practice; in particular, the special kind of incompatibility between rival schemes, corresponding to strategic and tactical differences. Fundamentally different schemes or different analyses within the same scheme may be compatible with familiar practice to an extremely high degree of approximation; and apparently, that is formally, insignificant differences in the basic schemes have enormous consequences. In short, we have here all the advantages and defects of an all-or-nothing approach to life, a point which Russell stressed (bottom of H.W.P. 643).
The next few sections describe briefly the background to Russell's logical analysis of mathematics; the tools (logical concepts) used for the analysis, and examples of analyses of familiar mathematical objects. It is often said that Frege's notation was 'cumbrous' and 'difficult to employ in practice ' (P.o.M. 501 ). This may be true-though after all Frege did employ it quite a bit. The differences in the purposes for which Frege and Peano employed their symbolisms seem more profound, as hinted at by Russell loc. cit. and stated more explicitly by Godel on p. 125 of Schilpp (1944) . Peano established that his simple vocabulary with a perfectly precise grammar had great expressive power throughout all of mathematics. Frege used his for the analysis of (logical) thought and for a particularly detailed derivation of arithmetic from pure logic.-Peano's aim and even the details have a permanent place in mathematical culture. But while the penetrating analysis of the most basic steps in logic was immensely fruitful for Frege, leading (him) to distinc tions and notions of permanent value, we should not nowadays follow his own line of exposition; it is much easier and more convincing to explain his logical discoveries by means of examples taken from more 'advanced' mathe matics where differences are greatly magnified; plain for all to see, not subtle as in elementary logical contexts. Besides, perhaps by mischance, logical analysis has so far been less rewarding for arithmetic than for many other branches of mathematics, even those existing at Frege's time. (Gauss did quite well in his Disquisitiones without knowing Peano's axioms.) It was left to Russell to set caution aside and to search for Principles of (the whole of) Mathematics, not only of Arithmetic.
Background
Analogues to the facts just described are easy to find in the development of the atomic theory of matter.
Background: sets and predicates Cantor, after studying the (mis)behaviour of trigonometric series at certain peculiar sets of points in the plane, went on to develop the properties of such sets more abstractly. Many familiar operations on sets of points or on finite sets (in the theory of combinations and permutations) were seen to be meaningful in a far more general context too. One operation, which turned out to have a particularly rich theory was the so-called power set operation ^:
x (-> 2X, which associates to any given set x the collection of all its parts (subsets). It provided examples of infinitely many infinite cardinals.
Just because Cantor's study began with (infinite) sets of points, it cannot be supposed that he relied on his experience with finite sets to develop the general theory. But it is true that many of his results, in particular those concerning the power set operation, are very well illustrated by finite sets; even by so-called hereditarily finite sets (also called the cumulative hierarchy of type oj) which are obtained from the empty set 0 by iterating the power set operation finitely often. (In symbols: C0 = 0 , Cn+X = ^(C jJ and -U« C»)* Only, as Russell put it (P.M. vi), the 'general laws [of C J are most easily proved without any mention of the distinction between finite and infinite'. (To be quite precise, Russell's remark applies to purely universal laws; for existential statements one has to look at the axioms used in the proof to verify in addition that a finite set realizes the statement.) One might add that the general laws are often better understood, for example by a child who has not yet convinced himself that the sets he knows-such as forests of trees or heaps of sand-can be counted at all.
Cantor gave some very general indications of the kinds of objects for which his assertions hold, for example, in Cantor (1899) or p. 282 of Zermelo (1932) ; saying that a set is a variety of objects (Vielheit) which can be grasped or comprehended as a unity (Einheit); but he did not draw many conclusions from this. Indeed, as far as (even today's) mathematical practice goes, little would be lost if Cantor's work were applied only to Cw+(0, that is, to the sets obtained from the collection of hereditarily finite ones by finitely many applica tions of the power set operation. Only, by P.M. vi, it would be 'a defect in logical style to prove for a particular class . . . what might just as well have been proved more generally'.-As usual, will mean: the object a is an element of the set X .
Frege considered a prima facie much more general notion, much farther removed from mathematical practice (then or now) than segments of the cumulative hierarchy described above. It is the logical notion of , with no a priori restriction on the kind of thing to which the predicate may apply. Such predicates are very common in ordinary life; for example, blue is understood without any clear idea of all the things past, present or future, mental or physical, that may be blue (in contrast to mathematical practice, where one has predicates or sets of something; We shall write a 17 Pf or: the predicate P applies to (t Instead of 'predicate' (P.M.) uses 'propositional function' which, as Russell says on pp. 69-70 of P.D., 'sounds perhaps unnecessarily formidable. For many purposes one can substitute the word "property" . . . but, except in ultimate analysis, it is perhaps easier to . . . use the word "class" .'* We use 'predicate'. To each set X corresponds of course a predicate Px where a 17 Px if and only if * As so often, defects in terminology reflect a defective analysis of the notion considered; cf. p. 602.
However, Cantor's explanation of 'set' shows clearly that there is no reason to assume the converse. Nevertheless operations on (Cantor's) sets often have analogues for predicates. Suppose we start with a variety V0 which is not a set, and form varieties Vn by an analogue of the cumulative hierarchy construction, where Vn+1 if and only if a -r/ Vn or <= J7 and is a set, that is, a can be grasped as a unity. Whatever doubts there may be about the notion of predicate, the Vn are predicates if any sense is given to Cantor's explanation and there should be a variety V0 which is not a set if Cantor's distinction is to be of use at all. (The hierarchy will be cumulative if V0 consists only of sets.) There will be frequent references to various versions of this hierarchy construction. This is not ad h o c , but connected with Cantor's 'set', if not only the variety in question, but also its elements, their elements, etc. are required to be 'unities'. The only quite unproblematic way of achieving this is to build them up from the variety of 'individuals' which are simply given as unities. This variety takes the place of V0 above (and the sequence Vlf V2,... may be continued beyond a>).
Actually most formal laws discovered at an early stage of the subject hold equally for sets and predicates (e and rj), about unions, differences, Cartesian products and the like; and again one 'might just as well' prove them generally. But this does not exclude basic differences between the notions; nothing could be simpler than the predicate, say V, which applies to everything; but it is hardly plausible that this variety V can be grasped as a unity.
Background: definitions of natural and real numbers
We begin with the natural numbers. In Dedekind (1888) there is a definition of the natural numbers in logical terms, that is, in the logical language built up from 17 or e. It does not define specific numbers 0 ,1 ,... but, as we should put it now, the class of structures (AT, S) where is a binary relation on X which are isomorphic to the natural numbers with the successor relation. This is accepted as a definition not because of some arbitrary decision but because of a discovery (made in the last century). Even when we think of the natural numbers as specific objects, the results we prove about them in pure mathe matics turn out to be true for all those ( , S) described above. And this empirical observation becomes a theorem if we confine ourselves to results formulated in logical formulae (not necessarily of first order languages) built up from the successor relation.
Russell had two objections (I.M.P. 10). First, Dedekind's procedure 'does not even give the faintest suggestion of any way of discovering whether there are such sets', specifically, sets X and S satisfying Dedekind's conditions. One may think that we do not need to discover them, because we already know the familiar natural numbers, and Russell's demand, for a logical foundation, may be considered a luxury. It becomes a necessity when we pass from arithmetic to problematic notions. His second objection is this: 'we want our numbers to 596 be . . . used for counting common objects, and this requires [them to] have a definite meaning, not merely . . . certain formal properties'. This matter is more delicate (and in any case, as will be seen below, the analogous requirement is not satisfied by Russell's own definition of the real numbers). But it is quite evident that not all isomorphic images of the natural numbers can be used for counting. Suppose a0,a l t ... is an aj-ordering (of say the usual words for numbers), but we do not know the value of say a5. We could not use the isomorphic image of a> above, that is, a0, ..., for counting in the literal sense because we should not know the numerical label for a set of 5 objects. (In current logic this remark is developed by use of recursion theoretic notions.)
Frege (1884), four years before Dedekind's publication as is pointed out on p. 1 of Frege (1893), does give definitions, in logical terms, for each natural number; for example of 1 as the class of all classes with a single element in Russell's formulation. It would be idle to speculate whether we 'need' these definitions; we evidently do not, as long as we are concerned with results that hold for all structures defined by Dedekind. The question is rather whether, at least sometimes, we can do better when we do have such definitions. Amusingly, developments of arithmetic in current set theory introduce such definitions: the empty set is taken to be zero, and either of the two functions:
x{ #}, s2: x h» u {x}, for the successor; and s2 generate the structures in which e is the successor and the order relation resp. A pedant would say that analyses the notion of natural number, s2 the notion of finite ordinal (tacitly assuming evidently the simplest relation of the set theoretic language, is to realize the successor, resp. order relation).
Dedekind (1872) also gave conditions, in logical language, for a structure {X, O) to be isomorphic to the real numbers; more precisely, to the ordering of the real numbers. Russell supplements the definition by treating each specific real number pa s a set of rationals (< and verifying th condition is satisfied if these sets are ordered by inclusion. The questions raised by Russell (I.M.P. 10) about applications of natural numbers (to counting) have their analogues here. But he does not discuss them. His definition is not particularly useful for applications within mathematics; for example for computing, Cauchy sequences, satisfying Vn(Vm > ( | 2~n), are better in the sense that we can effectively find sums, approximate Euler's constant y and so forth, while it does not seem to be known if one can effec tively decide for any rational r whether In short, there has not been much progress with Russell's (and Frege's) aim of finding 'privileged' structures in Dedekind's classes; perhaps the most one can hope is that relatively few specific structures will turn out to be well adapted for many uses (a topic for the philosophy of applied mathematics).
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New theories: Russell's paradox By the end of the nineteenth century it was known that then current mathematics could be 'reduced' to the natural and real numbers. So definitions of these objects in logical terms made it plausible that the grand old question: What is mathematics ? had a satisfactory answer (relative to the knowledge at the time). Russell saw this clearly soon after that exciting congress in 1900. Whatever the formal defects of (P.o.M.), it put the grand old question back on the map when the time was right. When actually carrying out the work, Russell and Whitehead were naturally led to rethink parts of the mathematics of the day, and to develop the new subject, the Mathematical Treatment of the Logic of Relations, mentioned by Whitehead as one reason for electing Russell to the Royal Society.
The critical problem was to find significant laws satisfied by the basic logical notions; a minimum requirement being that these laws provided logically defined structures which are isomorphic to the familiar mathematical notions. Frege (1893) contained already such laws which he himself used specifically in the case of natural numbers. His laws were amazingly simple since there was essentially just one principle: In modern notation, for each formula A of the language considered
3X\/Y(Yr]X<->A)
provided A does not contain the variable X. It is called comprehension principle, X 'comprehending' all objects Y which satisfy A.
Frege himself was quite aware that the principle was problematic: 'Ich halte [das Prinzip] fur rein logisch', on p. vii of Frege (1893) . He certainly con sidered the possibility that it might be contradictory (ibid. xxvi). He obviously thought it wasn't and made the-for him !-weaker prediction: 'Aber [daraus einen Widerspruch abzuleiten] das wird Keinem gelingen'. An even more convincing symptom of Frege's malaise was this 'evidence': 'Es ist unwahrscheinlich, dass ein solcher Bau sich auf einem fehlerhaften Grunde auffiihren lassen sollte'; P'rege insisted on the objectivity of logic and mathematics, and knew quite well from physics that there were grand, but false theories.
Cantor's review of Frege (1884) in Cantor (1885) was extremely critical of the comprehension principle. This is quite natural given his explanation of set (to which, howrever, he did not refer there explicitly). Within the context of Frege's language, the only way to talk about varieties was to introduce such formulae as A above, and so according to the principle every variety could be comprehended as a unity! (neglecting the distinction between r) and e). Cantor's own objection was quite specific; the extension of a concept, defined by the formula A, is in general quantitatively quite undetermined. But Cantor did not derive a contradiction at that time. When he did, in Cantor (1899), he did not publish it.
Russell derived a simpler contradiction (in 1901 some 15 years after Cantor's review) and did publish it. He arrived at it by analysing Cantor's proof of s analysis of arithmetic had turned out to be shaky). There was, unquestionably, a problem here; even if Frege's formula tion was a mere oversight, the fact remained that neither he nor anybody else had a theory; just because in his presentation everything had depended on that one comprehension axiom. One had to make a fresh start.
These facts leave no doubt about the objective interest of Russell's discovery. But, in addition, his and similar paradoxes seem to have considerable psycho logical interest since the reactions to paradoxes are both strong and diverse; possibly indicating, in a reliable way, striking personality differences. But existing studies, for example, Hermann (1949) , are not altogether convincing. Russell's own reactions, at least as he remembered them, seem very natural from what we know of his personality. 'It seemed unworthy of a grown man to spend his time on such trivialities, but what was I to do ?' (Ax 222). 'It was quite clear to me that I could not get on without solving the contradictions' (A! 228). He did not look for drama perhaps because he was able to get his 'kicks' elsewhere.
True, false, meaningless
One of the reasons why paradoxes are so disagreeable is that it is hard to locate an error, to 'solve' the paradox by specifying an error. In the familiar paradoxes produced by dividing by zero, a .a rx = 1 is asserted. There are two alternatives: (i) to require, as is common in logic, that the functions used must be defined on the whole range of the variables, in particular, 0-1 must have a (numerical) value; then the correction is:
-1, (ii) to take 0-1 as undefined and simply assert a.a~x = 1 for those a for which this formula is Biographical Memoirs significant. In isolation, the example does not decide convincingly between the alternatives. Just because-in this particular case and many like it-it obviously does not matter which decision is taken, we are liable to be unprepared when it does matter.
There is a further, more specific consideration which is perhaps more persuasive in the case of predicates, such as the formula A in the comprehen sion principle, than in the case of functions (where, as a matter of historical fact, Frege did use a type distinction from the start, as pointed out on p. 147 of Schilpp (1944) ). Why should we not simply decide that a predicate P does not apply to an argument a if, by intention, is meaningless ? As intended, 'the number 2 is blue' is meaningless; but one would rather have it false than true. More importantly, this remark shows why current systems of set theory, going back to Zermelo, are formulated without explicit type distinctions, although those systems are intended, in Zermelo (1930) , to apply to segments of the cumulative hierarchy of types; cf. p. 140 of Schilpp (1944) .
In the cumulative hierarchy on p. 594 it is natural to say-and explicit in Russell's doctrine of types-that xme y n is meaningless, if xm is introduced at stage m (of the hierarchy) and y n at stage n and m^n , since xm is not even a candidate for being an element of y n. However, in current is meaningful but false; and assertions of a logically compound structure are interpreted accordingly, for example ~\ xme y n is put true.
How can this kind of convention conflict with others or with axioms ? Most easily if we have an independent assertion relating such simple formulae. Specifically, in the instance of the comprehension principle used in Russell's paradox, consider the predicate PR determined by Y v Pr if and only if in particular, PRrj PR if and only if ~| Pr t]Pr (predicates and the relation rj are used in place of sets and e because, as pointed out in Cantor (1885) , the comprehension principle is not even remotely plausible for the latter). Suppose then that, as intended, PR rj PR is meaningless; then so is ~| PR. The con vention above requires PRr] PR to be put false, ~\ PRr] PR to be put true and this conflicts with PRrj PR <-^~\ PRrj PR. As in some other do we allow ourselves to parley at all, to entertain the 'proposition' PRr] PRt we are seduced.
A different matter, which Russell himself described as a puzzle in O.N., had drawn his attention to (the logical interest of) meaningless expressions; specifically the sentence 'The present king of France is bald'. Since there is no such king, the use of the definite article is improper. Here there is a relatively simple convention giving a manageable meaning to all such phrases, roughly speaking this:
If P(x) and Q{y) are formulae not containing unexplained occurrences of the definite article and ixP(x) stands for: the x which satisfies P then
and 3! means 'there is a unique . . (At the time it was satisfying to see that such matters could be expressed succinctly in Peano's language.) This meaning> due to Russell, was manageable in the sense that he found relatively precise and simple formal laws for expressions containing also i-symbols.* Russell's work is to be compared to the surprisingly simple and, more importantly, well-determined extensions of such arithmetic functions as: )-> ! to a wider domain (T-function), but, as so often, the mathematical example is more interesting.
There is no guarantee that equally manageable meanings exist for such expressions as
Pr V^r which occur in the paradoxes. If not this wo consistent with the view of many mathematicians at the time that very general logical ideas do not lend themselves to theory (except perhaps at a very advanced stage). This could be compared to so to speak the opposite extreme: in physics, apparently accidental facts. They are quite objective, quite striking, and therefore literally make up the bulk of the world as we see it, but do not have a simple theory; for example, of the fact that (the substance having the chemical composition of) glass is transparent. Be that as it may, the fact remains that without some definite meaning for formulae containing the expressions involved, the adequacy of the marvellous logical language on p. 592 is in doubt. The particular simple interpretation of the logical particles which leads to the familiar laws, does not apply. If the logical words are reinterpreted so as to apply to meaningless expressions, the expressive power of the simple vocabulary must be expected to be very much limited. This matter is wide open. At any rate, Russell pursued a different line.
Doctrine of types and use of types
Russell was always very quick to see, and formulate memorably, the ideas which naturally cross one's mind. He did this in D.T. in connexion with 'patching up' formally Frege's system. Some of his ideas have since been pursued, with varying success, as described by Godel on pp. 132-133 of Schilpp (1944) . Russell himself pursued less superficial aims:
To describe objects, that is, predicates and contexts involving them, that are clearly meaningful, and to state some of their properties.
To give reasons for supposing that those objects and contexts are exhaustive. (If the reasons given are not convincing, one speaks of a doctrine.) The objects described may of course have uses even if they are not exhaustive. The idea was that the predicates (considered) occur in a hierarchy, and that a context of the form Pr)P or QrjP is meaningless (excluded) if speaking, 'involved' in Q, the so-called vicious circle principle. Though, of course, it was important for Russell's own research to attempt a general Biographical Memoirs * These laws can be made quite precise relative to given primitive or atomic predicates. Any formal language is given with a list of such predicates, but not unanalysed ordinary language. Is male or (its negation) female primitive ?
formulation of the idea, it cannot be expected that his wording remains satis factory after more than half a century. Russell was too much of a pioneer for that. As Godel explains carefully on pp. 133-135 of Schilpp (1944) , Russell's formulation of the 'vicious circle' principle was defective. Formulation apart, even if there is circularity in some sense, it is not clear that it is vicious. We understand perfectly well many grammatical laws which patently apply to themselves: 'In basic English the verb follows the noun'. Again, in mathe matics, we understand definitions of Dedekind cuts, which are predicates of the rationals, even if the definition contains variables over Dedekind cuts. The same applies, of course, to definitions of integers of the form:
A is true and 1 if is false where A contains a variable over the integers. Of course, we have to under stand 'basic English', 'predicate of the rationals' (or 'set of rationals') or 'integer'. The logical 'essentials' of Russell's idea-which are related to ideas mentioned but not developed by Poincare-are most easily understood by comparison with the cumulative hierarchy described on p. 594-and a little difficult to follow without understanding the latter. (So this hierarchy is fundamental.)
In the full cumulative hierarchy, at any stage a> 0 , Ca = U C,u$(C,), fi<» where, as on p. 594, ^ is the power set operation; in particular = (C«).
(If C0 = 0 , each Ca is included in ^(C,,,), whence the simpler form on p. 594.) Speaking now of predicates instead of sets, Russell's idea* is realized if one passes from the predicates accumulated at stage a, say La, to the collection of only those predicates PF which are defined by formulae F with all variables restricted to La; here F is in the logical language considered (with additional symbols for the predicates in La) and
Xr]PF if and only if F(X) is true and X^L^.
This hierarchy is more difficult to understand than the (full) cumulative hierarchy because, for domains familiar in mathematics such as the set of integers, the idea of arbitrary subset (of the domain) is easier to think about than the idea of subset defined in some particular language. But for Russell it was perhaps natural to avoid the power set operation which led (him) originally to his paradox when he thought of applying this operation brutally to the 'domain' V of all things (p. 597); 'brutally' since, in terms of Cantor's explana tion (p. 594), every subvariety of a familiar domain (or set, grasped as a unity) is a set, but of course, not every subvariety of V. The explanation of the predicates Vn on p. 595 takes account of this difference; thus if V0 is the predicate of 'being a set', Vn = V0for n = 1,2,.... It may be difficult, though surely not impossible, to establish conclusively the role, in later research, of Russell's original, rather complicated, formula tion. One reason for the difficulty is this: in P.M., the simple idea of the hierarchy is mixed up with the so-called reducibility axiom. This was intro duced to derive formally the familiar properties of natural and real numbers as defined in P.M.; but the 'axiom' is just not true for the hierarchy here described (and Russell's lack of precision about the notion of 'predicate', its linguistic or abstract character (mentioned on p. 594), was natural: he was thrashing about for a notion which satisfied the axiom). Godel discovered a version, described on p. 147 of Schilpp (1944) , which makes sense of this axiom.
He first extended the hierarchy La to transfinite a, and then showed, for example, that all subsets of Lw , definable in any La, have already definitions in LM 1 where a>1 is the first uncountable ordinal. This is just what is asserted by the reducibility axiom applied to subsets of Lw, if LW l is taken to be the next stage of the hierarchy after LM . Roughly speaking, the axiom holds for the hierarchy La, if not all ordinals, but only cardinals a are considered. Godel's discovery is particularly relevant to a comparison between intensions and extensions, which concerned Russell a great deal (P.D. 87-88). Specifically, new intensions (that is, definitions) of predicates of appear at arbitrarily high La; but, for a ^ a>x, no new extensions <= w, that is, no new subsets of Lw. The 'totality' of all such intensions is far bigger than that of the corresponding extensions.
Interestingly enough, Godel's formulation of his results refers to axiomatic theories and their consistency properties, not simply to, so to speak, objective properties of the sets definable in the La's. For example, he speaks of consequences C of the 'axiom' that all sets are definable in the s and of its consistency relative to usual axiomatic set theory. But where C is stated to be such a consequence, often a stronger result is proved: C is true for the hierarchy of the La's even if some sets (of the full cumulative hierarchy) do not occur in any La.* Godel's language comes from Hilbert's 'rival' foundational scheme, from 'without', to use Russell's words quoted on p. 586 of part I-and is necessary if the rival scheme is accepted.
P.M. and the axiomatization of mathematical practice
As so often at an early stage of research, even the criticisms of P.M. were overoptimistic. The defects talked about most can in fact be corrected fairly easily (though, even now, these corrections are not as well known as the defects). The real difficulties were hardly discussed.
* For example, C may be the generalized continuum hypothesis; or the negation of Souslin's hypothesis by Jensen (1972) . In contrast we do not know whether Cantor's continuum hypothesis or Souslin's hypothesis is true for the full cumulative hierarchy; nor, equivalently, fo rC w+(0 on p. 601. In other words our present knowledge of sets is much more efficient when applied to the La's than when applied to the Ca's (in terms of which the La's are defined).
The first principal defect, particularly for the mathematician, was the complexity of the language of P.M. with its many types. Also the description of the syntax was not formally perfect; less so than Frege's as was pointed out on p. 126 of Schilpp (1944) -but of course, for this very reason, known to be corrigible. Ordinary mathematics provides many lessons for introducing a 'global' theory of objects of different types, which are, originally, arranged in stages; for example, of all those points in the Euclidean plane which are obtained from points with rational coordinates by means of n compass con structions. (Incidentally, the relation between this, Pythagorean, plane and the full Euclidean plane illustrates quite well many relations between the hierarchy of P.M. and the full cumulative hierarchy.)
The second principal defect, particularly for the logician, was the unsatisfactory status of the reducibility axiom which, together with a few others, took the place of the comprehension principle on p. 597. A better formal correction was proposed by Zermelo at about the time of P.M., but after Russell's fundamental article (D.T.), and clearly interpreted in Zermelo (1930) by reference to the cumulative hierarchy. For definite properties Pnot meaningless ones of p. 599
Va 3 x V y [ ye xf->(y e a A y r ] P)];
the side condition ye a expresses explicitly the difference between propert of ordinary life and in mathematics (p. 594): x is a set of s. When one has type distinctions, the condition y s ai s not needed because the variable y automatically limits the range of y (to the class, say of objects of type r). Enough properties P could be recognized to be definite to develop familiar mathematics from Zermelo's axioms (and modern extensions).
The real difficulties are closely connected with the view expressed in P.M. v: . . The chief reason in favour of any theory on the principles of mathematics must always be inductive, i.e. it must lie in the fact that the theory in question enables us to deduce ordinary mathematics'. P.M. was the result. Instead of trying to analyse what is meant by logical validity and to prove that the rules of the calculus generate all logically valid formulae (in the language considered), P.M. deduces a lot of such formulae. Instead of looking for some global features of ordinary mathematical concepts, for example, that any proposition about some specific objects such as the natural numbers is either true or false, and comparing these features with the formal properties of the calculus, P.M. deduces a lot of arithmetic propositions. In short, P.M. contains no metamathematical theory of its system, no (p. 586). Godel's completeness theorem for predicate logic and his incomplete ness theorem, for P.M. and 'related systems', w.r.t. quite simple arithmetic assertions are perfect examples of successful metamathematics. To be precise his original formally undecided assertions had simple metamathematical content (consistency); nowadays, we have undecided assertions of relatively simple number theoretic content, of the form: a diophantine equation in 14 variables, with prescribed integral coefficients, has a solution. But the metamathematical assertions were easier to discover.
The incompleteness theorem is by no means in conflict with the inductive evidence! There are plenty of unsolved problems in number theory. But it raises problems which one had hoped to avoid. What is a correct axiomatization or definition of a mathematical concept ? As long as one believes that all true propositions (in the language considered) are formally derivable, the question above may be bypassed. Certainly often formally different definitions, say P and Q, are proposed. A minimum requirement is that both P and Q are satisfied by the same objects x. So V x(P<-> Q )must be tru is also formally derivable, every assertion derivable for P is also derivable for Q-and in this sense it does not matter which of the proposed definitions is chosen. A more sophisticated complication is very familiar from the current mathematical practice of 'enriching the structure', which applies here as follows. Suppose we wish to axiomatize the concept of set in one-one corre spondence with the integers. Shall we define it as a set X with the side condition that there exists an enumeration ? or shall we take a pair ( , F ), where is a mapping of a> onto X, that is, with the side condition Evidently such complications would be minor if all true propositions could be formally derived, that is, if not all (sound) formal systems were incomplete. In connexion with completeness, that is, the requirement that all true state ments in the language considered should be formally derivable, the introduc tion of 'ugly' types is most natural: 'global' systems are obviously incomplete, for example, Zermelo's (without the addition of the so-called replacement axiom); one can express that there is a set of type co + w but cannot derive this assertion since the segment of the cumulative hierarchy below co + w satisfies the axioms and of course contains no set of type All this does not discredit the idea of a correct axiomatization-or, as Russell prefers to put it, analysis-of ordinary mathematical concepts; nor even an appeal to inductive evidence. It only means that the use of such evidence would have to be a great deal subtler than had been thought (by logicians). The same applies, mutatis m , to the system itself, the most simple minded criterion, of completeness, being demonstrably inapplicable since no formal system is complete (for the usual language of arithmetic).-Indeed, the sensitivity mentioned above to details of the axiomatization provides a rational means for finding a-or even thecorrect axiomatization.
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If one thinks of modern axiomatic mathematics, the hierarchy of P.M.-or rather, as always, its modern version La mentioned on p. 601 -seems to have potential interest for mathematics, in particular for the study of the full cumulative hierarchy. In modern mathematics one uses knowledge of the rationals and of other formally real fields to study the reals and, possibly, facts suggested by looking at the Pythagorean plane (p. 602) to study the Euclidean plane. So one asks: Do we gain anything by examining those properties (in a suitable language) which are not only true in some long specific segment of the cumulative hierarchy, but also for many La, with relatively small (countable) a ?; gain either because these La have an independent interest or because proofs which are valid for all these La provide a better analysis of the nature of the theorem proved. There is a good deal of work in this area, partly under the name of 'generalized recursion theory'. Though it has not yet provided a conclusive answer to the question above this study of the s, the direct descendants of Russell's hierarchy, still seems the best way of under standing higher set theoretical principles at all properly, and so use them effectively in mathematical practice. However natural the Ca's may be, we do not know enough about them for practical use; cf. the footnote on p. 602.
Finally and quite generally, as far as the analysis of mathematical practice is concerned, it should be noted that P.M. is much more detailed about the analysis of mathematical concepts than of mathematical proofs, or, more generally, of processes. For example, there is really no machinery in P.M. for formulating relations between proofs expressed by different formal deductions (from given axioms) of, say, the same formula.
P .M .: a parenthesis in the refutation of Kant
According to P.D. 75, this is how Russell himself thought of P.M. initially. (Considering the space Kant takes up to make his points about mathematics, the parenthesis is not very long.) Specifically Kant was led to connect the validity of mathematical assertions with the properties of our combinatorial, spatio-temporal imagination (Anschauung). His examples came almost wholly from traditional geometry; he neglected the massive work, at his time, on algebra and the calculus, let alone attempts at non-Euclidean geometry. (This neglect annoyed Cantor who, to Russell's delight in A 1 335 and again in P.D. 75, called Kant 'yonder sophistical philistine who knew so little mathematics'.) As always when psychological aspects are stressed, Kant's view suggested that mathematical experience did not lend itself to theoretical analysis.
Cantor's set theory made Kant's view extremely dubious (unless one regarded assertions about infinite sets as a mere fa<pon de parler). P.M. and work building on it certainly refuted the suggested implications: put quite conservatively, such work showed firstly, how the logical properties of mathe matical concepts could be built up systematically from a few primitives, and secondly, how much of pure mathematics was conserved if one confines one self to these logical properties. Perhaps it should be added that not only Kant's personal convictions were refuted, but what most people would have said too; even a century after Kant the expressive power of a few primitives came as a surprise.
There are at least two respects in which, at the present time, Russell's view of the refutation would be qualified.
The first qualification is minor. We should not stress as much as Russell the logical (rather than mathematical) character of the primitive notions. Put more formally, no very significant assertions about the logical notion of predicate and the relation rj (p. 594) are known. Of course, a formalism for this primitive notion can be set up and the property, say (E (of predicates P) P is built up in the cumulative hierarchy from the empty predicate can be defined in the language (using the device, on p. 594, for associating a predicate to each set). Then we merely assert that the predicates in (E satisfy the known facts about the cumulative hierarchy. But this procedure would not introduce any specifically logical properties which distinguish rj from e. If the assertions mentioned are the only axioms, we can consistently add: VP(E(P). Here, perhaps more than elsewhere, it is slightly easier to formulate the facts if one confines oneself to the hierarchy built up from the empty set, instead of starting with some indefinite variety of objects which are not sets or predicates. (The restriction is not arbitrary: specific mathematical structures have iso morphic copies in that hierarchy, copies which can be defined in the usual set theoretic language.)
The second qualification is more serious though it applies mutatis mutandis to any foundational scheme. It concerns the passage from a familiar concept, for example, of natural number, to its logical (or set-theoretical) analysis. Russell put the matter very clearly in his discussion of definitions on pp. 11-12 of P.M. : 'when what is defined is (as often occurs) something already familiar, . . . the definition contains an analysis of a common idea, . . . Cantor's definition of the continuum illustrates this: . . . what he is defining is the object which has the properties commonly associated with the word continuum.' Evidently, this passage or analysis is not part of the set theoretic development. The passage may be compared to the analysis of familiar properties such as colours in terms of physical theory. Views may well differ on what is lost, at the present stage of knowledge, by excluding the passage in question from an analysis of mathematics. It cannot be denied that the passage involves a different kind of reasoning from logical deductions, but after all, it is made by mathematicians. Realistically speaking there is as much certainty (agreement) on such analyses, for example on the definition of the length of a curve, as on the correct result of a long formal computation. More remarkably still, at least to the outsider, there is often agreement on the proper 'enrichment of struc tures' (p. 604). 
III. P h il o s o p h y , P ed a g o g y , L iterature
Scope of philosophy
It is a commonplace that the aims, the proper 'meaning', of a study will change as we learn more about the objects studied. Around 1912 when Russell wrote P.P., he formulated his views on the proper scope of philosophy, distinguishing two broad areas.
One was philosophic contemplation which 'views the whole impartially' and thus achieves an 'enlargement of the Self' (P.P. 245). In less exalted language this involves taking a broad view, not forgetting other sides of a question, generally giving matters a second thought rather than simply 'forging ahead'. It should not be assumed, as Musil (1930) warns in § 72 of book II, part 1, that philosophic contemplation will necessarily help in business, war or science.
The other broad area, which we shall call scientific philosophy, is described as follows (P.P. 239):
'Philosophy, like all other studies, aims primarily at knowledge . . . the kind of knowledge which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences, and the kind which results from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions.' The description is clear enough though it cannot be assumed that the common part of the various sciences (that which gives 'unity') will necessarily be particularly useful or interesting. As is to be expected of a science of philo sophy, it is not so easy to be precise about the features which distinguish it from 'ordinary' sciences. All the more since, as a matter of historical fact (stressed by Russell, P.P. 240), many present sciences were formerly included in philo sophy and some were created to answer such typically philosophical questions as: What is matter ? Russell's dicta concerning those characteristic features vary. But the one he stresses most consistently is the uncertainty of philosophy, with different emphasis in different contexts.
Perhaps the most positive formulation occurs in H.W.P. xiv. Philosophy is to teach us 'how to live without certainty'. In the context ( . cit.) Russell is preoccupied with the unfounded certainty of dogmatic theology; in the tradi tion of Kant, Russell looks to philosophy as a bulwark against the temptations of theology. Those of us who do not feel tempted will naturally interpret Russell's formulation more broadly and look to philosophy for help in the 'face of uncertainty'. There are two extremes corresponding to the two parts in Russell's description of scientific philosophy.
The passage from genuine uncertainty to moderate certainty; at the very beginning of scientific research when one really knows nothing about the nature of the objects considered (or the 'kind' of answers to be expected); and secondly the passage from theoretical uncertainty, that is, practical certainty, to some ideal certainty, which is the business of so-called critical philosophy; the aim of 'securing' mathematical practice, mentioned on p. 591, belongs here.
The next section concerns the first passage. The idea that there may be a distinct subject here is not discredited by ordinary experience of scientific work. There is a recognizable difference in the flavour of the kinds of arguments used for starting a science (in the 'face of uncertainty') and for developing (or finishing) it. This difference is particularly striking in the case of the so-called fundamental sciences which study the very large or the very small: here one could hardly start by following Francis Bacon's recipe for collecting data. In short, the arguments used within our ordinary sciences are not altogether homogeneous. Looked at this way, the first branch of scientific philosophy (in Russell's formulation in P.P. 239) would require us to separate different kinds of argument already used within science, and to see whether the arguments with a philosophical 'flavour' lend themselves to a systematic development. The separation of pure mathematics, as a distinct study, from its uses in scientific arguments would be a concrete example of the project considered.
Uncertainty and generality Even if the laws to be used in the 'face of uncertainty' are themselves perfectly certain they would not necessarily provide a panacea. There would be uncertainty about how to apply them in a practical situation and, more importantly, whether the application is of practical interest. So the search for such laws is not absurdly utopian. Perhaps the most naive idea for finding such laws is this:
If the laws are to be used in the 'face of uncertainty' they should concern arbitrary objects. The more general the objects considered the better the chance that laws about them can be applied without knowing the nature of the objects.
Evidently, the existence of valid general laws is not in doubt: we do not dispute that p implies p, nor other logical laws. What is needed, in Russell's words (I.M.P. 2), is a genuine 'enlargement of our logical powers' by means of laws which are (generally valid and) at least sometimes useful. Russell repeatedly discusses how one sets about finding such laws. A favourite of his (P.o.M. 3) was 'a precise analysis o f . . . the ordinary employment [of] a common wrord'. But unlike many of his would-be followers, he was less concerned with the so to speak literary aim of a faithful analysis than with scientifically fruitful analyses.* Russell unquestionably understated the progress made in the branch of scientific philosophy which searches for general laws, progress very much based on his own work. Practically speaking he probably simply did not know the details (though he seemed pleased when he heard about developments, for example, in (P.D. 101) and also in the conversation mentioned on p. 590). But there was also a theoretical obstacle; his stress on the identification of logic and mathematics. This suggests that there is no 'qualitative' difference between ordinary mathematics, correctly interpreted, and modern logic. Many mathe maticians have a different impression, and distinguish between different parts * The reader of pp. 603-604 in part II will recall the hazards of such an (inductive) analysis without safeguards against systematic errors and omissions.
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Biographical Memoirs (in developments) of Russell's work described in part II. Set theoretic struc tures and operations are seen to be natural extensions of familiar mathematics; less so results involving (logical) languages, in particular, of first order predicate logic. Such results have been applied within mathematics; partly in a routine fashion to formulate explicitly the general character of some 'easy' facts, partly with great imagination to solve old conjectures. Nobody questions the validity of these applications of logic. But inasmuch as they are 'qualitatively' different from ordinary mathematics, they constitute a 'qualitative' enlargement of our logical powers. They certainly help us some times to make a routine start in mathematics: to prove trivial things trivially (a, if not the, most useful result of having sound conceptions). The search for an enlargement of our logical powers recalls the heroic days of Descartes (1637) or Leibniz, as quoted, for example, in (P.L. [169] [170] [283] [284] . Both said-and surely believed-that their general rules of thought had led (them) to their remarkable scientific discoveries. These claims may well be true, but they are difficult to judge-as it is difficult to judge the actual role of general principles which (rich) businessmen believe to have led to their fortunes, as in Getty (1963); or those to which (healthy) centenarians attribute their vigour. The principles of first order predicate logic are easier to use; one need neither 'sincerely wish to be rich' nor have the iron constitution required to digest the health food which brings longevity.
The reader of part II will have noticed another, quite typical, heuristic value, for ordinary science (mathematics), of studying (mathematical) concepts with a philosophical 'flavour'. There is nothing particularly 'philosophical' about solving diophantine equations; but the concepts needed for establishing negative results were d i s c o v e r e d, by Godel, in connexion with logical problem (p. 603-604).
Critical philosophy and Occam's razor We now come to the second branch of scientific philosophy (in the sense of p. 607) about which Russell says (P.P. 233):
'The essential characteristic of philosophy, which makes it a study distinct from science, is criticism . . . it searches out any inconsistencies there may be in [the] principles [used] , and it only accepts them when, as the result of a critical enquiry, no reason for rejecting them has appeared.' The formulation is not perfect. To be consistent with Russell's description of the scope of philosophy, one would have to assume that this kind of criticism is likely to give 'unity and system to the body of sciences'. And, in any case, every (respectable) science rejects inconsistent principles. (Contrary to his memory in later years, for example (P.D. 11), at the time of (P.M.), Russell was not preoccupied with this kind of critical philosophy, at least as far as mathematical knowledge is concerned. This is clear from the quotation on pp. 591-592.)
The formulation of P.P. 213 is improved by Russell's description, on p. 13 of P.D., of the principal tool to be used in critical philosophy, Occam's razor to which he 'had become devoted': 'One was not obliged to deny the existence of the entities with which one dispensed, but one was enabled to abstain from ascertaining it. This had the advantage of diminishing the assumptions required for the interpretation of whatever branch of knowledge was in question.' As is well known, critical philosophy goes farther in practice: having shown that it was possible to dispense with certain entities for the interpretation of (existing) knowledge, it assumes that it is permanently desirable or even necessary to do so. Incidentally, Russell realized that it was not easy to be precise about meaningful uses of Occam's razor, about choosing the particular assumptions to which Occam's razor should be applied, but oversimplified matters in P.M. 91, 1.5; also earlier (P.o.M. 15) and later (P.D. 71). He looked for a reduction in the number of assumptions or of undefined terms, as if one could not be as wrong about one unfamiliar or complicated thing, such as set, as about twenty familiar ones such as numbers, points, etc.
Occam's razor is also applied in ordinary science, but with fundamentally different aims (two of which will be mentioned below). They too concern the analysis of existing knowledge, but they are not negative, not essentially critical.
First of all, Occam's razor provides a tool for action in the 'face of uncertainty,' complementary to the use of laws about arbitrary entities on p. 608. Instead we see how far we can get without assuming anything about certain entities which we don't happen to understand. Here Occam's razor is generally of temporary heuristic use. In any case ordinary scientific knowledge is not static; as a given branch of knowledge develops, the entities in question may become 'indispensable'. In fact more is true: unless there is independent reason for suspicion of the entities dispensed with, one will try to extend existing know ledge in such a way that additional assumptions are required for its interpreta tion! just as the decision between (sensible) rival theories is rarely made by use of existing knowledge: one has to invent a novel experimentum crucis. In other words, in ordinary scientific practice one will often conclude from an application of Occam's razor that existing knowledge is inadequate for studying the entities in question, and no more.
A second, also positive use of Occam's razor has proved fruitful so to speak at the opposite extreme when a branch of science is in a very advanced state: the application of the axiomatic method, especially in mathematics. Having established a result about a specific mathematical object, say, the real numbers, one examines which properties of the object are used in the proof and 'dispenses' with its other properties which are superfluous for the given result. But the reason for doing this is not that those other properties are any more dubious. (The reasons vary; from genuinely useful generalizations to what might be described as an analysis of the nature of the specific result.) However, it should be remembered that critical philosophy played an impor tant heuristic role for modern axiomatic mathematics, even on a technical level! One of the early results which were most useful for its developments was the algebraic treatment of polynomials in Sturm (1835) . His express purpose was to avoid continuity considerations which he believed to involve infinitesimals, and wanted to dispense with the latter; a perfect example for Russell's views (p. 610) on Occam's razor. Sturm's treatment survives; the aim does not, since Cauchy made continuity considerations independent of infinitesimals (and, besides, Sturm's work applies to non-archimedean fields too, that is, fields which do have infinitesimal elements). The reader of part II may wish to pursue the following parallel between Sturm's work and P.M. Inasmuch as P.M. served as a parenthesis in the refutation of Kant (p. 605), its axiomatization also fits Russell's description of Occam's razor; one 'dispensed' with Kant's acts of intuition. (And as Russell could have said, one was not obliged to deny that such acts occur in actual mathematical reasoning.) The next step in the parallel is to compare Cauchy's analysis of continuity to Zermelo's analysis of the cumulative hierarchy and Godel's of the reducibility axiom (described in part II). Possible uses of the hierarchy of P.M. in generalized recursion theory, mentioned on p. 605, correspond to standard practice of modern axiomatic mathematics.
To sum up; so far critical philosophy seems to have had considerable heuristic, but less permanent, value. Particularly as far as ordinary knowledge is concerned, views will differ on the interest of the following result of critical philosophy (P.P. 233, 234): 'as regards what would be commonly accepted as knowledge . . . we have seldom found reason to reject such knowledge as the result of our criticism'. Paranoids ought to be reassured. Indeed the methods of argument in critical philosophy may even have clinical value since paranoids are notoriously sensitive to logical rigour. (Some are certainly capable of con viction by the right kind of argument: one of the three Christs of Ypsilanti in Rockeach (1964) was convinced by the others that he was mistaken.)-Less speculatively, critical philosophy may lead to more interesting results at the frontier of knowledge; as suggested by the example of Frege's analysis of thought on p. 593 and, particularly, by Einstein's success, on p. 612. The questions of critical-and other traditional-philosophy would not be 'deep' if we really wanted to answer them in the context where they occur to u s; they are exciting (and difficult to judge) because they draw attention to a new kind of study which is not forced on us by familiar experience.
From what we know to how we know
In the preceding two sections the stress was on objects (and not primarily on our assertions about them); on extending the class of objects considered to get general laws, and dispensing with entities by means of Occam's razor. This respects Russell's manifesto in P.D. 16: 'I reverse the process which has been common in philosophy since Kant, [which was] . . . to begin with how we know and proceed after wards to what we know. I think this a mistake, because knowing how we know is one small department of knowing what we know.' This type of mistake is familiar from popular positivist philosophy which proposes to begin with methods of measurement (as means of knowing) while, in point of fact, one has to examine whether proposed methods are ; 612 whether they measure what we want to know about and not artifacts. Russell s work in logic, as was stressed at length in part II, certainly fits in with his manifesto, and so does the work on the atomic structure of matter with which the logical analysis of mathematics was compared there. It should be added that in these cases one hardly goes on at all to the second stage, of analysing realistically the processes which bring us knowledge. It should not be assumed that this last omission is a mere accident. Observation of the facts of out intellectual experience shows that we can often be more sure of what we know than of how we (come to) know it; however strange this may seem on the so-called empiricist or any similarly simple-minded conception of our intellectual apparatus (wie sich der kleine Moritz das Denken vorstellt). Russell, according to P.D. 13-14, did want to proceed to the second stage (how we know)-though, apparently, not in the case of mathematical or logical knowledge-'. . . in the years from 1910 to 1914, I became interested not only in what the physical world is, but in how we come to know i t . But, to quote Einstein's remark on p. 290 of Schilpp (1944) concerning Russell s theory of knowledge, the latter was infected by a touch of bad intellectual conscience. This came about because Russell looked for an empiricist analysis in the style of Hume, where our concepts are 'reduced' to, that is, obtained inductively from, sense experience. (In the case of mathematical knowledge more or less sophisticated-versions of this style of empiricist analysis are required by the doctrines of formalism and finitism mentioned on p. 591.) Russell, reluctantly, came to the conclusion that many of the concepts we constantly use could not be so reduced, and remained troubled about them in contrast to Einstein. It should perhaps be added that Einstein makes these concepts a little too mysterious, on p. 286 of Schilpp (1944) , by insisting that they are free creations of our minds. The concepts would be less mysterious if, practically speaking, we had no choice: there would be little to distinguish them from what (we believe) is externally given.
When looking back (P.D. 12) at his change in interest, from what we know to how we know, Russell connected it with his having done all that [he] intended to do as regards pure mathematics'. But the change is also in keeping with one of the great events of the first decade of this century, Einstein s special theory of relativity. Einstein's own presentation did begin with an analysis-in accordance with P.D. 16 quoted above-of how we know (simultaneity), for the critical purpose of searching out serious inconsistencies in the accepted principles of determining simultaneity; at least, when objects move at high relative speed. From that analysis one could then proceed to ask what we know (not space, nor time, but space-time). Incidentally, Einstein's reservations mentioned above about the positivist or empiricist theory of knowledge were not due to ignorance of its-occasional advantages, on the contrary, Einstein was initially strongly attracted by the positivist views of Mach, but abandoned them after closer reflection. Russell's later ideas on how we come to know the physical world (as summarized in chapter II of P.D.), refer quite explicitly to the physiological apparatus of perception-in
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contrast to Einstein's exposition of his, perhaps, singular success with critical philosophy. Views differ on whether the properties of this apparatus are essential for Russell's aim. But if they are, the time is hardly ripe for pursuing this aim. Judging whether the time is ripe for a problem is of course essential for all research, but especially in philosophy; perhaps not surprisingly because the questions occur to us when we know very little. With wit and literary skill something of interest can no doubt be said about them at any stage; but at a given stage there is often-demonstrably-nothing significant or conclusive to be done. The physicist will here think of such a natural question as: What is matter (made of) ? at the time of Galileo or Newton, who both had brilliant arguments for some kind of a micro-structure. The mathematician will think of questions about the need for abstract ideas in mathematics when all we know is numerical arithmetic or even elementary geometry.
Pedagogy in the large
We now turn to two social changes which are, at least formally, connected with Russell's writings-on logic, not on war and peace. These changes, which literally affect the lives of many of us, the way we spend our time, come from the introduction of the New Maths and from the use of computers, particularly for so-called non-numerical computation. The connexions are clear.
P.M. is about logic and classes (sets), and claims that they provide the means for the correct analysis of other mathematics. The New Maths teaches children about these things before teaching them sums and what Russell called 'childhood's enemy' (P.o.M. 90).
P.M. expresses a great number of sophisticated mathematical concepts in terms of those logical primitives in a formally precise, that is, purely mechanical manner. The effective use of computers patently depends on the possibility of this kind of mechanization.
The actual, causal, role of Russell's writings in bringing about these social changes is less easy to establish, and perhaps not even important for under standing social history, for example, if good ideas may be expected to be 'in the air' (a view which could be connected with rushing into print). Be that as it may, there are some outstanding qualities of Russell's writings which have surely influenced the details of those social changes.
First, as Einstein stressed on p. 278 of Schilpp (1944) , there are few scientific writers and certainly no contemporary logicians who catch the reader's imagination so vividly and so agreeably as Russell; incidentally, not only by form but also by content. Specifically, though the earlier work of Frege (1884) and (1893) is, in some respects, more satisfactory to the professional logician, the fact remains that Frege wrote about arithmetic, about the question: What is a natural or real number? while Russell asked: What is mathematics? (By p. 593, even formally Frege's caution was hardly justified, at least on present knowledge.) The bold sweep of Russell's presentation may well have impressed some of the educational reformers who worked for the New Maths, at least in Anglo-Saxon countries. After all, educational reforms can hardly be based wholly on empirical evidence since their effects are difficult to trace, let alone to predict. So it ought to be a comfort to know that one should begin with logic because, as Russell taught, mathematics logic. As suggested above, this factor influenced details and the style of the reform. But also the principal factor involved is not unrelated to Russell: the success within mathematics (in establishing mathematical facts and mathematical fashion) of the logical and set theoretic notions first treated systematically in P.M.
Secondly, in connection with the exploitation of computers, which require an artificial language, Russell's writings must have helped by establishing confidence in the expressive power of such languages. Before him there was little practical evidence for this power (or, at least, not widely known). Of course there were highly mechanized languages, for example, for military orders, but these were not thought of as a sophisticated business. And there were theoretical arguments against artificial languages, for example, the dispute with Condillac described in Maistre (1821)-with interesting political over tones which will come up again on p. 616. In short, it is suggested that Russell's writings established a favourable intellectual climate for the use of computers. Naturally, it is more difficult to be sure about effects on any particular scientist such as von Neumann, perhaps the principal pioneer of computer science; his early work concerned a theory related to Russell's D.T. and, of course, P.M. Here again it is suggested that Russell's writings affected the details in the development of computer science; but, in this case, not the principal factor (which is, presumably, the technological advance in electronics).
Russell himself does not seem to have written about the two social changes here considered. He certainly would not have liked all aspects of these changes. Perhaps he would have had-to use his own words about The conquest of happiness (A2 228)-'commonsense advice' for atomic scientists, divided between the (moral) agony of responsibility and a (wicked) sense of power; of having been responsible for something sufficiently powerful to merit the agony.
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Pedagogy in the small Russell's writings, particularly on logic, are distinguished also by another, apparently quite intimate, didactic quality. A host of memorable metaphors, aphorisms and analogies relieves the reader of all anxiety about the knowledge he has and about the work to come. Russell formulates the questions that occur to the reader at the moment when they arise; even the right irrelevant ones, confusions. In short, Russell has great understanding of the feelings we have about our scientific knowledge. Descriptions of these, as of other feelings are liable to be tedious and banal. Russell avoids this because he always sees the, so to speak, universal element in these feelings-like such novelists as Musil or Solzhenitsyn. Incidentally, the quality under discussion of Russell's scientific style is relevant to a principal gap between science and current literature: the characters of most novels go through life without any thoughts or feelings about (their) scientific knowledge, in conflict presumably with the actual experience of those readers who happen to be scientists. (Evidently such a literary treatment of our feelings about knowledge may be satisfying at a stage when, objectively, there is nothing significant to be done; in contrast to the view about scientific philosophy on p. 612.)
Russell himself, quite explicitly, attached great importance to the universal element mentioned above. As early as 1900, he devoted § 1 of P.L. to 'reasons why Leibniz never wrote a magnum opus', concluding that Leibniz did not use sufficiently impersonal, universal arguments because he was too much con cerned with persuasion of some particular person; and quite specifically, according to p. vi of the second edition of P.L., of 'Princes and (even more) Princesses'. Some of us may have doubts about the validity of Russell's explanation; but we can have no doubt about his view on such matters.
Actually, a good deal of Russell's pedagogic skill is used on subjects which nowadays, when more facts are known, are easy to present; it is not necessary to spend nearly 20 pages on the notion of order (P.o.M. 199-217) . The skill would, presumably, be more essential for a task which Russell often mentioned as a principal job of philosophy: the discussion of indefinables, as he called them in P.o.M. xv and P.D. 81, or, better, of primitive ideas (P.M. 91):
'primitive ideas are explained by means of descriptions intended to point out to the reader what is meant; but the explanations do not constitute definitions, because they really involve the ideas they explain.' (Of course, 'description' is not used in the technical sense of the i-symbol on p. 66 or p. 172 of P.M. and 'definition' is not used in the informal sense of analysis of a familiar notion, top of p. 12.) More precisely (P.D. 81), the reader's attention is to be drawn to the entities concerned (as in pointing a finger at an object in front of us). One way of doing this is to state striking formal properties of these entities, so-called axioms which can often be relied upon to indicate the entities (and can be misunderstood, like pointing). Presumably, pedagogic skills like Russell's can sometimes be used more effectively than those axioms for conveying primitive ideas.
The 'intimate' pedagogy here described seems to be similar to the other, non-scientific, area of philosophy which was mentioned at the beginning of part III. It is perhaps of interest to go briefly into Russell's views on these matters at different times.
Philosophic contemplation
On the face of things Russell changed his mind about the efficacy of philosophic contemplation. When he was forty, he was most positive (P.P. 243-250); twenty years later (A2230) and again in M.D.20 he said: 'the "consolations of philosophy" are not for me'. On closer inspection the conflict disappears. In P.P. he meant by 'contemplation': reflection on unfamiliar possibilities (P.P. 243), viewing 'the whole impartially' (P.P. 245). Later he meant: gazing at the stars or admiring the universe for its size, and found that these activities did not console him. Views differ on whether one should look for consolation at all or be an activist; also on the extent to which philosophic contemplation presupposes a suitable temperament. But there is no doubt that the later Russell hardly ever engaged in philosophic contempla tion in the sense of P.P. The two examples below are chosen because of their connection with the work described in part II.
The corner stones of Russell's logical theory were: first, his warnings about the 'irrelevant notion of mind' (P.o.M. 4) or an 'undue admixture of psychology' (P.o.M. 53)-although of course, naively (whence the need for the warnings), the mental phenomena of logical activity strike us first. Secondly, the famous analogy of (I.M.P. 2):
'Just as the easiest bodies to see are those that are neither very near nor very far, neither very small nor very great, so the easiest conceptions to grasp are those that are neither very complex nor very simple.' In the context 'simple' is used in a logical sense; but the remark applies also to space or matter when 'simple' is used in a physical sense; evidently it is intended generally as an introduction to 'high' theory.
Both these points are in sharp contrast to the style of his analyses of social and political problems, for example, in N.P. concerning politically important motives. Certainly, there is no guarantee that these problems lend themselves to high theory at all. Even so, Russell's analyses do nothing, in conflict with the requirement of philosophic contemplation (P.P. 243), to stop 'the world [from becoming] definite, finite, obvious'. Besides, like everybody else, Russell was quite ready to apply his 'logical' maxims to economic life; to accept that this is dominated by rational self interest, yet knowing perfectly well that, individually, businessmen are as lazy, vain and generally irrational as the rest of us. (Presumably their irrational actions cancel out.)
The second example does not involve delicate moral issues. The subtitle of H.W.P. reads: [Philosophy] and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances. True, Russell interprets 'social' in a rather broad sense, for example, in his analysis of Nietzsche's views on etiquette (H.W.P. 767); but in the discussion of the philosophical works of Frege or of himself there is simply no trace at all of any connexion with social circumstances. Yet, in the ordinary sense of 'philosophic contemplation' and particularly in the sense of P.P. 244, one should look at oneself from outside. Now it so happens that the matter of artificial languages, a principal topic of P.M., has traditionally been regarded as a political issue, at least in Romantic and nationalist political philosophy. This was mentioned on p. 614 in connexion with the conservative de Maistre and the progressive Condillac; but also, back in the Theaetetus (184c), Plato has Socrates connect formal precision with lack of breeding. Evidently, the conservative view was that there is a universal human capacity for acquiring formal languages, but that only people of the same (proper) background are capable of free and easy intellectual intercourse. In modern jargon, formalization or mechanization would be needed not only for com municating masses of information, but simply for communicating information to the masses. From this point of view formalist philosophy suits the outsiders as, according to some Marxists, idealist philosophy suited the ruling classes. P.M. shows how unexpectedly far the-accepted-universal capacity for acquiring formal language goes, and may be thought to weaken the conservative case.
It is of course a fact that the century of democracy is also the century of formalization to which P.M. contributed so much. But this fact, and the connexion it may suggest, did not have an important place in Russell's view of things. In short, whatever its practical merits the view was often-to quote again from P.P. 243-characteristically z/wcontemplative, 'unfamiliar possi bilities [being] contemptuously rejected'.
Russell's picture of America
It remains to mention Russell's view of ordinary life around him. Probably, his encounter with America is as representative as any other part of his long, active and varied life. On the personal side, he returned there repeatedly in the first half of this century, worked there as already mentioned in part I, and both his first and last wives were Americans. Also, for anyone interested in the liberal ideas of the last century, America is simply bound to be fascinating. Although it is unfashionable to say so, these ideas-as originally conceivedhave been followed there to an incomparably higher degree than elsewhere. Some highly uniform societies have been more democratic, for example, in ancient Greece (if the slaves are not counted) or modern Sweden (where legal discrimination on religious grounds till the middle of this century may have encouraged homogeneity). But, for good or ill, America has provided incom parably more opportunity for the (instant) use of native talents and for social mobility than any other country with a similar population mixture; for groups of widely different background or none at all as it were: chasing opportunities, many practically lost their mother tongue altogether.-It would, perhaps, be too much to expect that this social mobility would benefit only people of excep tional refinement and sensibility or that it was likely to create social conventions (on speech and manners) which work smoothly and naturally.
Russell's America consisted mainly of university society; at both ends of the scale (Harvard and midcentury U.C.L.A.), and figures on its borders such as the self-made millionaire Dr Barnes, a patron of the arts and humanities, who battled with Russell over Pithergawras (A2 338) . This society has changed since Russell's days, particularly after the first Sputnik. But as far as his times are concerned, the picture created by Russell in his auto biography is certainly quite true. The picture is produced by a series of concrete episodes; several of them are gems, for example (Aj 325-327). The short description of the bullying President of U.C.L.A. (A2 333) conveys much of the atmosphere, since made familiar by McCarthy (1952) , the famous novel about administrators at a minor American university. The comparison between the reactions to policemen of his young son and of university professors accused of speeding (A3 13) is, or should be, a classic.
As already mentioned, Russell's picture of his times in America is true; both perceptive and very amusing. What is striking is that the picture includes very little reflection about the overt facts, little connexion with general views which he expresses so to speak abstractly. Specifically, he said quite explicitly (A3 329) that 'institutions mould character'. His picture of the characters he met in America does not include any reflection on how they were 'moulded' by the social institutions of the country. (Yet most of the concrete episodes merely illustrate the surely obvious consequences of the social mobility of American society mentioned already.) Nor does he speak of the inherent difficulties when academics who are accustomed to judge cases become university administrators whose business it is to settle cases. The difficulties were compounded at the end of the thirties by the fact that many distinguished exiles had jobs below their academic standing at American universities. This put the administrators in a false position. Russell mentions that some of these administrators were pompous bullies; but not the temptation-in their position-to stand on their dignity. They did so in the style they had learnt at (American) public schools or, perhaps, from Hollywood films. Since Russell does not mention these things, his picture also leaves out the remarkable qualities of those characters who lived under the same institutions but did not offend his aesthetic sensibilities.
For present conceptions, Russell's view of America is narrow, especially ifas seems appropriate-one thinks of other great writers with high ideals. Thus, Solzhenitsyn (1968) and (1968a) present public prosecutors and commissars as 'moulded' by institutions, caught up in them. This then leaves room for real moral freaks, good or bad, as in the portrait of Stalin in Solzhenitsyn (1968). Russell's view doesn't.
On the other hand, present views on social matters are probably narrower than Russell's-which he called his 'social vision' (A3 330). He saw 'in imagination the society . . . where individuals grow freely, and where hate and greed and envy die because there is nothing to nourish them'. There is little in his autobiography to make his vision concrete. He does not seem to have been particularly romantic about humanity-in-the-raw; in (At 240, 244) and especially in P.D. 214 where he criticizes Tolstoy for his saintly picture of Russian peasants. Yet however unconvincing it may be (at least for those of us who do not know these peasants), this picture makes Tolstoy's social vision quite concrete, since the vision is practically realized already.
There is much more to convey what Russell called his 'personal vision', above all the description of his relation with Joseph Conrad (Ax 320-324), obviously-for Russell-a kind of paradigm for the possibilities of human relationships. There is deep admiring affection and, in particular, there is no trace of contempt for any aspect of the other person. And other episodes and letters in the autobiography suggest that, all through his life, Russell was linked to several people by similar, so to speak, chemical bonds. These bonds seem to have developed freely and naturally without the caution or cunning calculation which are sometimes said to be necessary to protect such relations and which were so alien to Russell.
